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1. The impact of the crisis on migration and integration trends 
 
 
1.1 The crisis notwithstanding, stocks keep growing 
 
Legally resident foreign population in Italy has almost tripled in the last decade, and doubled over 
the last five years only. Such high growth rates over such a prolonged period have probably no 
equivalents in Europe, but for the case of Spain. This remarkable trend has continued rather steadily 
during the last two years, despite the economic crisis, as shown by figures on stocks of foreign 
resident population in Figure 1. The economic recession has not prevented people from migrating to 
Italy. Throughout 2009 and 2010, inflows have only slightly decreased with respect to 2008 and 
continued to outweigh outflows very substantially. The positive net migration both in 2009 and 
2010 has kept the stock of foreign population growing, although to a lesser extent than in 2008 
(Table 1).  
 
The  steady  growth  in  stocks,  until  the  beginning  of  2011,  suggests,  at  a  first  reading,  that 
immigration to Italy has not been strongly affected by the economic crisis so far. This is not just the 
consequence of a fundamental (and partly physiological) rigidity of legal migration policies, which 
– in Italy as elsewhere - need some time to adapt to evolving constraints. As we will see in greater 
details below, the persisting immigration growth is also to be connected with a persisting, although 
controversial and uneven, need for foreign manpower, which has convinced decision-makers to 
maintain legal channels relatively open also in times of crisis. 
 






















Foreign resident population (right axis)  Share of foreign population on total (% right axis)
 
Source: Istat, population registers. 
 
Nonetheless, some signals of a deterioration of the capacity of the Italian economy to absorb large 
flows of foreign workers can be read in the uneven distribution across geographical areas of the 
slowdown in net migration. A strongest assessment on this point will only be available in the next 
months when updated data on migration flows in the different Italian regions will be available, 
however according to data for 2009, the reduction in the net migration growth rate has resulted 
comparatively  more  marked  in  north-eastern  Italy  (-38%  as  compared  with  a  national  average 
decrease of -25%), an area where immigrant labour is highly concentrated in export-oriented small  
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and medium manufacturing firms and is therefore particularly hit by the ongoing downturn (Tab. 1). 
 
Table 1. Net migration flows and one-year percentage change by geographical areas in Italy 
  2007  2008  2009 
One-year % 




change in net 
migration 
2008/2009 
ITALY  + 493729  + 458644  + 343764  -7.1%  -25.0% 
North-West  + 156145  + 144775  + 113882  -7.3%  -21.3% 
North-East  + 121573  + 125960  + 78215  3.6%  -37.9% 
Centre  + 129382  + 119710  + 93604  -7.5%  -21.8% 
South  + 86629  + 68199  + 58063  -21.3%  -14.9% 





1.2. Asymmetrical impacts on the labour market: an overview 
 
The limited impact on stocks so far, does obviously not imply that the economic downturn is not 
having a broader impact on migration, and in particular labour migration, which, of all types of 
migration, is expected to be affected most. 
A comparison of trends in employment levels of foreigners and natives shows an important and 
unexpected feature of the Italian labour market: while native employment has declined substantially 


























































Natives  (left axis) Foreigners  (right axis)
 
     Source: Istat, Labour Force Survey. 
 
However, on the unemployment side, the persisting and increasing gap between the unemployment 
                                        
 
1   Italy  is  in  fact  the  only  country  among  Germany,  France,  UK,  Spain  and  Greece  where  the  foreign 
employment never gave up  increasing in levels in the last years.  
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rate of foreign and native workers clearly show that the economic crisis has reduced the capacity of 
the Italian labour market to absorb the increasing flows of foreign job seekers (Figure 3). 
In the beginning of 2009, the unemployment rate of immigrant workers has – for the first time in 
recent years – overtaken the symbolical threshold of 10% and has reached level 13% in the first 
quarter of 2010, bringing the gap between natives and foreigners unemployment to the record level 
of 4.5 percentage points. Furthermore, seasonal foreign employment, again for the first time since 
many years, did not contribute to reduce this gap in the third quarter of the year span. 
Since the beginning of 2010, however, the trend has reversed for both groups of workers, with 
foreigners’ unemployment rate decreasing at a double speed than for natives (-3% against -1.5%). 
 

























































1.3 The impact on immigrants: lower than expected 
 
However  serious  is  the  situation  illustrated  by  these  figures,  it  has  to  be  stressed  that  both 
unemployment levels among foreign workers and the gap with natives’ unemployment rate remain 
lower than in other EU countries having also recently experienced large labour immigration. Most 
notably,  the  labour  market  situation  of  immigrants  deteriorated  more  rapidly  and  deeply  in  a 
country under many respects comparable to Italy as far as labour immigration trends are concerned, 
such as Spain (OECD 2009, in part. pp. 17-19; for more details on the comparability of the two 
country cases, see Finotelli 2009; see also the chapter on Europe by F. Pastore in this volume). 
In fact in Spain the gap between the unemployment rate of natives and foreigners in the third 
quarter of 2010 is over 10 percentage points; in the same time period in Germany and France, the 
foreign unemployment rate is almost double than the natives' one. In addition, many European 
countries have seen not only a reduction in the capacity of their labour markets to absorb foreign 
manpower, but also a deterioration of immigrants’ employability. In Spain, the level of foreign 
employment started to decline at the end of 2008 and did not recover since then. A similar situation 
is found in France, where the foreign employment level shows negative growth rates throughout  
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2009 and started growing again only in the first quarter of 2010. The effect of crisis is of course 
highly differentiated among EU countries
2, in this context Italy distinguishes itself in being the only 
one where foreign employment never gave up increasing in absolute levels during the whole period 
under consideration. 
 
Although immigrants in Italy are extensively employed in jobs normally classified as vulnerable in 
case of economic crisis, such as low-skilled jobs and jobs in the construction sector, the impact of the 
current  crisis  has  so  far  turned out to be less  severe than what expected on  the basis  of  the indicators 
commonly used. One important determinant of such unpredictability probably lies in the different responses 
that low and high skill employment opposed to the economic crisis. As a matter of fact, when 
considering such response patterns separately, it appears evident that high skill employment has 
been affected earlier and more seriously by the economic crisis than low skill employment (figure 
4), indeed contributing to the different trend in foreign and native employment. 
 












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
High skill Low skill
 
   Source: Istat, Labour Force Survey. 
 
Thus, in the Italian case and contrary to what generally assumed, concentration in low skilled jobs 
turned out to be more a determinant of immigrants’ resilience rather than an aspect of vulnerability 
in times of crisis.  
The  peculiarity  of  the  Italian  response  to  the  economic  downturn  emerges  also  when  recent 
employment  trends  are  analysed  separately  by  sectors.  The  construction  sector  is  generally 
addressed as one of the sectors more heavily and directly suffering the downturn. This generated a 
particularly  worrying  outlook  for  Southern  European  countries,  which  stand  out  for  the  strong 
presence of foreign workers in construction. 
In Italy in 2008, at the beginning of the crisis, the share of foreign workers on total employment in 
the construction sector was in fact 14.5% with respect to a lower 8.2% in manufacturing and a 
global average of 7.5% (Table 2). 
 
                                        
2   For instance in Greece foreign employment levels start to decline only from the second quarter of 2010 on.  
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Table 2. Distribution of foreign and native employment by sector at start of the crisis (2008) and 
employment variations by sectors for native and foreign workers 
 
Incidence of 




One-year % change in 
native employment  
 
One-year % change in 
foreign employment 
    2008/2009  2009/2010  2008/2009  2009/2010 
Total  7.5%  -1.6%  -0.8%  8.4%  8.5% 
Agricolture and fishing  6.6%  -2.3%  0.4%  29.8%  14.9% 
Manufacturing  8.2%  -4.3%  -4.1%  -1.3%  0.0% 
Construction  14.5%  -1.3%  -0.4%  9.3%  11.4% 
Commerce, hotels   and restaurants  6.7%  -2.3%  -0.9%  3.1%  9.2% 
Other services  6.3%  -0.1%  0.6%  14.4%  10.9% 
Source: Istat, Labour Force Survey. 
 
However, in Italy, as shown by figure 5, the economic recession has  primarily reduced employment 
in the manufacturing sector (about -4% loss in employment in both 2009 and 2010), while the 
construction sector has limited its losses to -1.3% in 2009 and -0.4% in 2010. This may contribute 
to explain why foreign employment has been comparatively less affected than that of natives.  
Thus, in this respect the experience of Italy is substantially different from that of Spain, although 
the two countries have often been singled out as the main representatives of a hypothetically distinct 
“Mediterranean model” with regard to migration (most recently, see Arango et Al., 2009). In the 
case of Spain, in fact, also due to the fact that the crisis was triggered with a collapse of the housing 
sector, with the burst of the notorious burbuja, immigrants have indeed been dramatically hit by 
employment losses in this sector. 
 











commerce, hotel and restaurant other services
 
   Source: Istat, Labour Force Survey. 
 
In addition, in  the  Italian  case, it turned out  that the recession affected differently natives and 
foreigners, also within the same sector, with foreign workers reacting better than natives overall. In 
particular, in the manufacturing sector (Table 2) the immigrant component was reduced only in 
2009 and by a limited -1.3%, with respect to a reduction in the native component of more than 4% 
in both years 2009 and 2010.   
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1.4 Gender asymmetries: Another Italian peculiarity? 
 
We have highlighted above the peculiarity of the response of foreign employment to crisis in Italy. 
But the aggregate picture does obviously not tell the whole story. Disaggregation of figures by 
gender provides essential additional insights. 
 
Since  several  years,  Italy  is  going  through  a  phase  of  gender  rebalancing  of  its  fast  growing 
immigrant foreign population. Such trend has two main causes: a) a constantly expanding wave of 
formal family reunions (but also of unauthorised family regroupments); b) a substantial increase in 
the phenomenon of autonomous female migration (with female migrant workers as first migrants) 
addressed  mostly  to  the  home-  and  health-care  sectors  (for  an  updated  and  comprehensive 
overview, see Catanzaro and Colombo, 2010). The combined effect of these two phenomena has 
been  an  ever  more  marked  feminization  of  immigrant  population  in  Italy,  with  the  female 
component  overcoming  the  male  component  since  2007  (see  Figure  6).  It  has  to  be  stressed, 
however, that such overall demographic rebalancing “hides” very deep and persisting differences in 
the gender balance among national communities.  
 
 







2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Males Females
 
   Source: Istat, population registers. 
 
This  trend  towards  feminization  contributes  to  explain  the  way  in  which  the  crisis  is  hitting 
immigrant  employment.  Data  on  employment  rates  by  gender,  in  fact,  show  a  less  heavy 
occupational impact of the crisis on female workers (Figure 7). As a matter of fact, although starting 
from much higher levels, foreign women’s unemployment rate has been soaring less than men’s. 
Such gender asymmetry in favour of female workers is rather peculiar in the European context and 
might  be  a  consequence  of  the  high  concentration  of  female  immigrants  in  the  homecare  and 
healthcare sectors, which has been less exposed to the oscillations of economic contingency (Figure 
5). The reduced purchasing capacity of Italian families, however, does not allow to rule out that, 
should the crisis have a “long tail”, this comparative advantage of female foreign employment will 
be  eroded  in  the  future  months.  In  other  words,  crisis-hit  Italian  families  have  until  now  cut 
selectively on more superfluous expenses, but if the crisis bites deeper, even care expenses could be  
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negatively affected. It is premature now to conclude that the slower reduction in the unemployment 
rate among females with respect to males and the corresponding widening of the gap between the 
two, as shown by Figure 7 in the first three quarters of year 2010, can indeed be ascribed to an 
asymmetrical impact of the crisis, as suggested above. 
 



















































     Source: Istat, Labour Force Survey. 
 
 




However important, the occupational impact is obviously not the only relevant profile in order to 
assess the overall impact of the economic crisis on migrants. The weakening of the labour market 
position of immigrant workers has immediate repercussions on all the dimensions of everyday life, 
starting from the housing conditions. From this point of view, the mid-2000s had been marked by a 
strong growth in the number of real estate purchases by foreigners in the Italian housing market. 
Such trend is at least in part to be interpreted as a consequence of a precise adaptive strategy by 
immigrant families, who seek as soon as possible to buy a house in order to escape the severe 
obstacles met on the market of house rents due to heavy and diffuse ethnic discrimination (Ponzo, 
2009a). Already in 2008, however, the sudden increase in mortgage rates has caused a collapse in 
house purchases by foreigners. This trend has been made more acute by the change in lending 
strategies by commercial banks, less and less willing to grant mortgage loans covering the entire 
value of the house to purchase. 
As shown in Figure 8, such downwards trend in the access to ownership has continued in 2009 and 
2010,  as  an  indirect effect  of  the  occupational  downturn.  The  decrease  in  house  purchases  by 
foreigners since 2007 was more marked than the general slowdown in the residential real estate 
market (Table 3). The increasing difficulties that foreigners meet in the housing market are also 
                                        
3   Sections 1.3 and 2.2 are reviewed and updated versions of the corresponding sections in F. Pastore, Italy, in J. 
Koehler, F. Laczko, C. Aghazarm, J. Schad (eds.), Migration and the Economic Crisis: Implications for Policy in the 
European  Union,  International  Organization  for  Migration,  2010, 
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Migration_and_the_Economic_Crisis.pdf, pp. 121-137;  
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illustrated  by  their  growing  demand  for  public  housing  and  their  over-representation  in  the 
generally expanding pool of eviction orders due to missing payments in rent contracts (Ponzo, 
2009b). 
 

















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of purchases by persons of foreign nationality
 
   Source: Scenari immobiliari. Note: Figures for 2010 are estimates. 
 
 
Table 3. House purchases 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
               
Total house purchases  804126  833350  845051  806225  683783  609145  611878 
House purchases by foreign immigrants   110000  116000  131000  135000  103000  78000  53000 
               
Share  of  house  purchases  by  foreign 
immigrants on total 
13.7%  13.9%  15.5%  16.7%  15.1%  12.8%  8.7% 




Income reductions, associated with a stronger perception of economic insecurity for the future, are 
obvious predictors of a decrease in remittances. In the present situation, however, given the global 
scope of the crisis, which is affecting countries of origin sometimes even harder than receiving 
countries, the declining capacity to remit could be compensated with a stronger “moral propensity” 
to transfer money in order to counter growing poverty back home. The overall impact of the crisis 
on remittances is therefore not easy to predict in abstract terms, and it may vary significantly from 
one  immigrant  community  to  another.  In  the  Italian  case,  data  on  the  total  volume  of  official 
remittances (those monitored by the Bank of Italy, not including “informal channels” nor bank 
channels, but only Money Transfer Operators and the Post) show a contraction in the growth rate of 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total remittances Asia Europe Africa America
 
Source: Banca d’Italia. 
Notes: values in millions of Euros; total flows and by region of destination. 
 
Actually, when per-capita remittances are analysed in order to take into account the growing foreign 
population, it comes out that the propensity of immigrants to transfer money in their home country 
has registered a significant reduction in recent years. Such reduction affects remittances directed 
towards all continents, although it is more evident in the case of Africa, and in the case of Europe, 
where the recent developments are just a consolidation of an already existing negative trend (Table 
4). 
 
Table 4. One-year percentage change in per capita remittances 
  2006/2007  2007/2008  2008/2009 
EUROPA  -16.6%  -11.6%  -6.8% 
AFRICA  16.1%  -6.8%  -15.7% 
ASIA  71.8%  -4.0%  0.1% 
AMERICA  16.5%  2.0%  2.2% 
TOTAL  18.8%  -6.9%  -2.8% 
Source: Banca d’Italia. 
Notes: per-capita remittances are computed as the ratio of total remittances by region of destination and 
foreign resident population from the same area of origin at the end of the corresponding year. The total 
values refer to the total flows of remittances over the total foreign resident population. 
 
In  specific  local  contexts,  scattered  qualitative  evidence  suggest  an even  bleaker  outlook,  with 
reports of cases of “reverse remittances” (i.e. families in the country of origin transferring money to 




It is even harder to assess migrants’ behaviour in response to the ongoing crisis in what is rightly 
perceived as a crucial sphere, i.e. returns. This is primarily due to the notorious unreliability of the 
official statistical figures on outflows, which is particularly serious in the Italian case.  
                                        
4  See, for instance, “La Stampa”, 4 November 2009  
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According  to  such  data,  however  the  crossing  out  of  foreign  residents  from  Italy’s  population 
registers  have  been  limited  through  latest  years  (outflows  are  always  less  than  1%  of  foreign 
residents)  and    mainly  constant  in  volumes.  The  National  Statistical  Institute  itself  (ISTAT) 
recognises  that  this  is  a  gross  underestimation  of  the  actual  return  and  re-emigration  flows  of 
foreign nationals from Italy. Such underestimation is partly compensated by the relatively high 
number of deletions for cause of “untraceableness”, which certainly includes a significant share of 
returnees. 
The one-year difference in foreign resident population, net of inflows (a very rude proxy of total 
outflows) shows an increasing trend both in absolute and relative term (Table 5) 
 
Table 5. Outflows estimate 
  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Absolute values  21,472  37,905  62,961  80,059 
Share over foreign resident population  -0.7%  -1.1%  -1.6%  -1.9% 
Source: Istat, population registers. 
Notes: Outflows estimated as the difference between foreign resident population at the beginning and 
end of the year, net of inflows. 
 
The lack of reliable official statistics is unfortunately not compensated by research data: as a matter 
of fact, quantitative research on return migration remains very limited
5. 
Initial qualitative evidence gathered by FIERI in 2009 and 2010 seems to show that crisis-induced, 
temporary returns from Italy are increasing, particularly in the case of Moroccan immigrants in 
Italy. The relatively light impact of the global crisis on Morocco could explain this apparently 
higher propensity to adopt return as an adaptive strategy. Impressionistic evidence highlights the 
existence of a number of other adaptive strategies by migrant families in this period of crisis: these 
include delayed family regroupment and what we could call “family de-groupment” (i.e. return to 
the country of origin of only a part of the family – typically, for Moroccan migrants at least, wives 
and children – while the male breadwinner stays put
6). 
Deeper insights on such adaptive behaviours and strategies, their socio-economic consequences and 
policy implications, would require more in-depth qualitative, and possibly quantitative, research. 
 
                                        
5   An important exception is the project "Collective Action to Support the Reintegration of Return Migrants in their 
Country of Origin" (acronym: MIREM, http://www.mirem.eu/) carried out from 2005 till 2008 by the Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence. The survey carried out in three Maghreb 
countries  (Algeria,  Morocco,  Tunisia)  by  MIREM  provides  valuable  information  on  socio-economic  and  personal 
factors driving return choices by migrants. Unfortunately, the MIREM survey, carried out from September 2006 to 
January 2007 does not provide any direct evidence on the impact of the current economic downturn on returns to the 
Maghreb. 
6  In such cases, initial evidence shows that Moroccan immigrant workers sending the family back home tend to get 
back to housing solutions which are normally typical of early migration stages, such as flats collectively rented by 
groups of male migrants.  
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2. The crisis impact on public attitudes and policy responses 
 
2.1. Public opinion trends: some Italian peculiarities in the European context 
 
How are the social and economic trends described above reflected in the public opinion? And how 
are the recent changes in Italian public attitudes related to observable trends in other European 
countries?  Even  in  the  deplorable  absence  of  an  official  and  Europe-wide  survey  of  European 
citizens' attitudes towards immigrants, an important ongoing polling and research initiative called 
Transatlantic Trends - Immigration (TTI) allows us to give at least some partial responses to such 
crucial questions. 
TTI is a periodical thematic opinion survey whose third wave was carried out in September and 
November 2010 in six EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom) and two North American countries (USA and Canada)
7. With over seventy questions, the 
TTI poll covers a wide range of topics, including both a) individual knowledge and assessments on 
immigration as a social and economic phenomenon, and b) personal convictions and normative 
preferences in the field of migration and integration policy. 
Without being able to give here a general description of TTI 2010 results, it seems nevertheless 
useful  to  select  a  few  particularly  significant  questions  which  allow  to  illustrate  some  recent 
tendencies in the Italian public opinion, and to set a summary comparison with other European 
national contexts. Such questions – some of them quite general and others concerning specific 
aspects that we deem especially relevant in a comparative perspective - are the following: 
- “Some people say that immigration is more of a problem for Italy. Others see it as more of an 
opportunity.  Which  comes  closer  to  your  point of  view?”.  Among  the  TTI  questions  targeting 
general attitudes towards immigration, this is singled out here as a particularly clear and telling one. 
- “How much do you agree/disagree with the following statement: legal/illegal (the question is 
repeated for both categories) immigrants increase crime in our society”. This question is selected 
here due to its central relevance in order to inquire attitudes towards immigration as a “law and 
order” issue. 
- “How much do you agree/disagree with the following statement: Immigrants generally help to fill 
jobs  where  there  are  shortages  of  workers”.  This  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  key  questions 
concerning the economic value of immigration. 
- “Generally speaking, how  well do you think that muslim  immigrants  are  integrating into the 
Italian  society?”.  Among  the  few  TTI  questions  which  focus  on  the  cultural  dimension  of 
immigration, this explores the hotly thematised boundary with Islam and assumes therefore a strong 
comparative relevance. 
- “With an ageing society, to what extent do you support or oppose the following actions aimed at 
solving potential shortages in the workforce? Encouraging immigration for employment purposes”. 
We  have  selected  this  question  as  an  especially  significant  indicator  of  long-term  normative 
attitudes towards immigration. 
                                        
7   The  Key  Findings  Report  and  the  Topline  Results  of  the  2010  survey  are  available  at  web  page 
http://www.gmfus.org/trends/immigration/2010/.  
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Table 6. Italian vs. average European attitudes on immigration 
Questions  2008  2009  2010 
Ia. Immigration more problem than opportunity (Italy)  45  49  45 
Ib. Imm. more problem than opp. (EU average)  43  51  49 
II.a Legal/illegal immigrants increase crime (IT)  NA  34/77  56/57 
II.b Legal/illegal immigrants increase crime (EU)  NA  37/61  42/61 
III.a Immigrants help fill labour shortages (IT)  78  71  76 
III.b Imm. help fill labour shortages (EU)  78  71  68 
IV.a Muslim immigrants as “integration problem” (IT)  NA  NA  49 
IV.b Muslim imm. as “integration problem” (EU)  NA  NA  58 
V.a Immigration as response to ageing (IT)  54  NA  46 
Vb. Immigration as response to ageing (EU)  52  NA  51 
Source: TTI 2010 database. 
 
However selective of the dimensions of public opinion on immigration that are highlighted, this 
comparative table allows some interesting hypotheses. In the first place, it is remarkable that the 
crisis does not increase dramatically the share of interviewees believing that immigration as such is 
a major social problem. With regard to question I, the percentage of “anxious” Italians (Ia) is even 
smaller than the European average (Ib).
8 
The outlook changes significantly, however, when focusing on immigration as a “law and order” 
issue. A majority of Italians believe that “immigrants increase crime” (question IIa in Table 5). 
Quite surprisingly (and differently from 2008), in 2010, Italians were largely unwilling to make a 
clear distinction between legal and illegal immigration as a factor boosting criminality. Europeans 
respondents (IIb), on the contrary, in average tend to differentiate clearly: while 61% believe that 
illegal immigrants do in fact contribute to increase crime, only 42% think the same of documented 
foreigners. Such Italian specificity could possibly be related with the kind of political discourse 
which has become dominant in Italy over the last few years. As reflected also in recent policy 
developments (see the next paragraph), the political discourse of important segments of the current 
political majority tends to merge legal and illegal immigrants in a fundamentally distrustful if not 
explicitly hostile frame. 
Question III, on the other hand, shows that, the crisis notwithstanding, a vast majority of Italian 
respondents (76% against 68% as EU average) still believe in the fundamentally positive economic 
impact of immigration. However, this pragmatic awareness of the utility of migration seems to be 
limited to the short term. When asked – as in question V – if immigration can contribute to solve 
problems associated with population ageing, only a minority of Italians (as against 51% in the EU 
average) agree. 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the Islamic religious and/or cultural belonging of immigrants is 
perceived (question IV) in less problematic terms than in most other European countries included in 
the survey. 
 
                                        
8   The EU average is based on five national samples for 2008 (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom), whereas 2009 and 2010 average values incorporate also the results of the Spanish survey (a Spanish sample 
has been included in the TTI survey only since 2009).  
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2.2. Policy trends: weak closure on admissions, strong closure on rights 
 
How does the political system react to the complex developments sketched so far? This general 
question  can  be  split  in  two:  a)  Which  are  the  specific  policy  responses  to  the  crisis  in  the 
immigration  and  integration  policy  fields?  b)  How  are  broader  policy  responses  to  the  crisis 
affecting – intentionally or not - migration and integration dynamics? 
 
It is still too early to give an evidence-based answer to the second question. One fundamental 
hypothesis deserves however to be formulated at this stage: most general (i.e. non migrant-specific) 
measures taken to protect occupation seem de facto to benefit more native than immigrant workers. 
This is the case for instance with public schemes aimed at delaying permanent reduction of the 
employed labour force by granting a public salary to workers who are temporarily left unemployed 
by their private employers. Such schemes (called Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, i.e. something like 
“Revenue  Support  Fund”)  benefit  exclusively  or  predominantly  workers  with  stable  contracts, 
whereas  immigrants  are  by  far  overrepresented  in  temporary  and  unstable  categories  of 
employment. 
 
More can be said on the first question: Which are the specific policy responses given to the crisis in 
the  immigration  and  integration  policy  fields?  Here  too,  however,  a  very  important  caveat  is 
necessary. In the Italian case, the connection between recent migration policy developments and the 
ongoing  economic  crisis  have  generally  been  loose.  This  can  be  said  in  two  distinct  and 
complementary senses:  
 
A) first, not all recent migration policy developments have predominantly (sometimes not even 
marginally) been driven by, and justified with, arguments based on the ongoing economic crisis. As 
we will see below, some very important recent policy decisions were predominantly driven either 
by structural factors relatively disconnected from the crisis (such as the historically high degree of 
path dependency of Italian migration policies: for instance, the 2009 regularisation is just the last 
one of a series started in the early 1980s) or by purely political factors such as the high (and 
growing) degree of ideologization of the migration policy debate. As for this latter factor, a key role 
was played by Umberto Bossi's Lega, a powerful component of the current right-wing political 
majority, currently holding the key post of Interior Minister with Roberto Maroni. 
B) In the second place, even when the crisis was mentioned as a relevant factor in driving migration 
policy decisions, there has been little in-depth preparatory research on the actual crisis-migration 
linkages, and the evidence bases of crisis-driven migration policy decisions have generally appeared 
weak. This, by the way, reflects - although to an especially  high degree – some more general and 
traditional features of the Italian political system, such as the low status granted to scientifically 
produced empirical evidence as a criterion for policy decisions and the fundamental weakness of the 
policy-research nexus. 
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Let us now turn to briefly illustrate the main policy developments in the migration and integration 
policy  fields  since  the  second  half  of  2008.  We  will  list  them  briefly  by  sticking  to  a  basic 
distinction  between  A)  admission  measures,  where  the  restrictions  have  been  moderate  and 
temporary in nature, and B) measures dealing with the status of immigrants already in the country 




A) Temporary restrictions on admissions for economic purposes. 
A In the first phase of the crisis, Italian admission policies were largely unaffected by the negative 
economic  outlook.  Between  the  end  of  2008  and  the  first  months  of  2009,  two  governmental 
planning decrees (decreti-flussi, i.e. the regulatory tool used in the Italian system to set annual 
ceilings for seasonal and non-seasonal admissions for working purposes) were issued for a total of 
230,000 new admissions (of which 150,000 restricted to the homecare and personal care sector and 
the  remaining  80,000  for  seasonal  workers),  down  from  252,000  (of  which  170,000  for  non-
seasonal  entries)  in  the  previous  year.  Such  moderate  cuts  in  admissions  were  an  indirect 
confirmation of the widespread perception (even within the social and political milieux which are 
less programmatically in favour of immigration) that immigrant and native labour force are largely 
complementary in the deeply segmented Italian labour market. 
The worsening of the occupational situation since mid-2009 pushed the government to freeze entry 
planning for 2009 and 2010. Quite paradoxically, however, it did not prevent the executive to adopt 
a selective regularisation scheme in the Summer 2009, once again selectively targeting personal and 
homecare workers,. This new regularisation was launched in August and, at the closure date (30 
September 2009) it raised around 300,000 applications from employers asking to regularise already 
existing working contracts with undocumented immigrants (Colombo, 2009). 
After a two years stop to new entries other than seasonal, it was only at the end of 2010 that the 
Italian labour admission policy set in motion again. With a decree signed at the end of November 
2010, the President of the Council of Ministers officially reopened the tap and set a ceiling for a 
maximum of 104,080 recruitments from abroad of non-seasonal foreign workers. Employers could 
start  filing  their  applications  since  the  end  of  January  2011  or  beginning  of  February  2011 
depending on the employment category and nationality of the worker concerned. The maximum 
level of allowed admissions was reached within a few hours each time and a total of almost 400,000 
applications were filed. Even though significant shares in these applications will result formally 
invalid and possibly fraudulent, such high levels of demand are unquestionably a sign that the crisis 
has eased in the low-skilled labour market, at least insofar as foreign workers are concerned. 
                                        
9  We will not devote specific attention here to the measures taken in the field of border controls and the struggle 
against  human  smuggling  and  undocumented  immigration.  This  choice    was  made  mainly  because  no  major 
discontinuity was introduced in these areas by the economic crisis.  
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Table 7. The Italian admission policy for non-seasonal immigrant workers (2006-2010) 







visas for working 
purposes/ 
Applications 
2006 (Decree of the President of the 
Council of Ministers, 25 October 2006) 
170,000 – A subsequent decree was 
adopted at the end of 2006 in order 
to allow the satisfaction of all 
residual applications thereby de 
facto turning the admission 
procedure into a regularisation. 
427,865  0.40 
2007 (Decree of 30 October 2007)  170,000  741,912  0.23 
2008 (Decree of 3 December 2008)  150,000  381,000  0.39 
2009  0  0  / 
2010  104,080  392.310  0.27 
Source: Planning decrees for each year and Colombo 2009. 
 
B) More structural restrictions on immigrants' status and integration. 
In July 2009, when the crisis was approaching its peak, the Parliament adopted a major reform of 
immigration law in the framework of a vast and heterogeneous bill on “citizens' security” (law 15 
July 2009, No. 94, entitled “Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica”). The bill had initially 
been presented in Parliament in June 2008 with the joint signatures of the Head of Government 
Berlusconi (Partito della Libertà-PDL) and of the Ministers of the Interior (Maroni, Lega) and of 
Justice (Alfano, PDL). The bill had initially no connections with the economic crisis, and even 
during the lengthy parliamentary procedure, the contingent state of the economy was not one of the 
main drivers of the debates. The result has been a very controversial piece of legislation, which 
hinges on two fundamental moves: 
a) the reframing of illegal entry and stay as criminal offences punished with a pecuniary sanction 
and with immediate expulsion (on the constitutional debate stirred by these new provisions, see Di 
Bari, 2010; Masera, 2010); 
b) the systematic weakening of the status of legal immigrants through (among else) the enactment 
of a points-based system for the renewal of stay permits and more restrictive housing requirements 
for family reunion (Pepino, 2009). 
The 2009 Law on Security was complemented in 2010 with implementing regulations and some 
new legislative initiatives. A special mention should be made in this regard of the ministerial decree 
of 4 June 2010 by which the Minister of the Interior has established that the granting of long-term 
resident permits to third-country (non-EU) nationals is conditional upon the results of a test aimed 
at assessing linguistic proficiency in Italian. 
Somehow contradictorily with the proliferation of new administrative control tasks introduced by 
the  law  94  of  2009,  the  last  few  years  were  marked  by  dramatic  cuts  on  funds  available  for 
immigration policies in general, and especially for integration policies at both central and local 
level.  A  complete  and  detailed  overview  of  such  reductions  at  regional  and  local  level  is 
unfortunately missing. As for the national level, mention should be made of the Fund for the Social 
Inclusion of Immigrants (50 millions € per year), established by a Centre-Left majority with the  
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Budget Law for 2007 (Law No. 296 of 2006) and completely suppressed in 2008 by the then newly 
formed Centre-Right majority. In this case too, the decision to suppress the Inclusion Fund was not 
motivated with explicit reference to the crisis (which was still in an embryonic phase), but it was 
rather the result of more fundamental ideological options on the priorities of public expenditure.  
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